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ABSTRACT 
Algorithmic contracts are contracts in which an algorithm determines a 
party’s obligations. Some contracts are algorithmic because the parties used algo-
rithms as negotiators before contract formation, choosing which terms to offer or 
accept. Other contracts are algorithmic because the parties agree that an algo-
rithm to be run at some time after the contract formation will serve as a gap-filler. 
Such agreements are already common in high speed trading of financial products 
and will soon spread to other contexts. However, contract law doctrine does not 
currently have a coherent approach to describing the creation and enforcement of 
algorithmic contracts. This Article fills this gap in doctrinal law and legal litera-
ture, providing a definition and novel taxonomy of algorithmic contracts. 
The algorithmic contracts that present the most significant problems for con-
tract law are those that involve “black box” algorithmic agents, whose decision-
making is not functionally understandable ex ante – or sometimes not even hu-
man-intelligible at all. There is only a tenuous case for their enforceability under 
currently accepted approaches to contract law. The Uniform Electronic Transac-
tions Act (UETA) was written and widely adopted nearly twenty years ago to 
make sure that contracts made electronically using basic automation techniques 
would be recognized as enforceable. However, the language of the UETA may be 
read to treat all putative contracts made with algorithms as properly formed, 
simply because they happen to be electronic. Unintended consequences of this ap-
proach include opportunities for fraud, market manipulation, and a general lack 
of algorithmic, and thus corporate, accountability.  
This Article’s approach looks to the common law of agency for inspiration. 
 
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law.  The author acknowl-
edges Jack Balkin, Frank Pasquale, Daniel Markovits, Joshua Fairfield, James Grim-
melman, Ian Ayres, Andrea Matwyshyn, Val Ricks, Mark Burge, Rory van Loo, BJ 
Ard, Nick Frisch, Adriana Robertson, Adrian Kuenzler, and participants in the In-
ternet Law Works-in-Progress Conference at New York Law School and the Un-
locking the Black Box: The Promise and Limits of Algorithmic Accountability in the 
Professions Conference at Yale Law School for helpful comments on earlier ver-
sions of this Article. 
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Some algorithms commonly used in contract formation have been delegated a level 
of responsibility that justifies the use of agency principles. When algorithms take 
on a role in contract formation analogous to that of human agents, they should be 
considered constructive agents for the purpose of contract formation.  The com-
pany consenting to the contract can be said to have authorized or ratified the con-
tract formed on its behalf by the algorithm. This approach explains easy cases 
while also showing why algorithmic contracts, even many black box algorithmic 
contracts, are enforceable. Furthermore, establishing a doctrinally robust connec-
tion between the actions of the algorithm and the intent of the contracting party 
promotes algorithmic accountability. 
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 At 2:45PM on May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
dropped by 9%.1 No market or political event presented a trigger.2 Mil-
lions of dollars were lost in a matter of minutes.3 A report by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission months later stated that the Commis-
sion could not declare what caused the crash.4 Despite years of study 
since, the mechanism that triggered the reaction is not fully understood, 
not least because many of the algorithms involved are proprietary.5  And 
since nobody understands what causes flash crashes like this, they are 
happening more and more often. The Dow Jones had a flash crash of 
 
 1.  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF 
MAY 6, 2010, 1-4 (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/mar-
ketevents-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF8U-EKCC]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See id. at 6. 
 5.  Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 682 (2013). 
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similar magnitude less than two years later, and similar events have dot-
ted the global landscape.6 
In the seconds leading up to each of these flash crashes, securities 
were being bought and sold in milliseconds, with prices being deter-
mined by algorithms. What is often missed in discussions of the growing 
influence of algorithms in trading is that contracts were at work here 
too, enabling formal alienation of the resources. Algorithms determined 
when the trades happened and at what prices. It has been said that algo-
rithms shape our world.7  But it is contracts that give algorithms the 
power to change our world by enabling businesses to exchange re-
sources and services, with the law’s power backing the transaction.8  
Without legal reform, flash crashes could become endemic to any 
number of industries. And the results of such unexpected, undesired ab-
errations resulting from algorithms might not be so readily reversible 
in other contexts. In areas such as health care and safety measures, life 
and death may literally be dependent on the results of algorithms.9 Ul-
timately, regulating the content of algorithms should be the subject, at 
most, of sector-specific reform. However, creating legal incentives for 
entities that use algorithms in contracting to understand and take re-
sponsibility for the actions these algorithms take is required to preserve 
human responsibility and conscious choice in an increasingly auto-
mated society.10 
Contracts enable individuals to demonstrate their preferences. The 
freedom of contract allows individuals to express their valuations of 
property and services and make appropriate exchanges. Traditional 
contract law assumes that some individual is doing conscious evaluation 
and that contracts disclose information about how society’s collective 
valuation. Every contract contains information about how parties val-
 
 6.  E.g., Pooja Thakur and Jonathan Burgos, Singapore Strengthens Securities 
Rules After Stock Rout, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2014-08-01/singapore-regulators-tighten-rules-after-
penny-stock-rout [https://perma.cc/N55C-M6BD]. 
 7. E.g., Kevin Slavin, How Algorithms Shape Our World, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/30/kevin-slavin-how-
algorith_n_1120684.html [https://perma.cc/5J6Z-SDKU]. 
 8. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2nd ed. 2006) (describ-
ing law, norms, markets, and architecture as four regulatory mechanism, with com-
puter code the most critical—and least visible and popularly understood—aspect of 
architectural regulation in modern society). 
 9.  See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 419 (2015) (describing the use of algorithms in medicine and the legal and 
ethical problems posed thereby). 
 10.  Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 
1031, 1036 (2016) (“Automation raises serious concerns for the effectiveness of the 
traditional liability framework and the allocation of costs it imposes in securities 
trading.”). 
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ued the component terms of the contracts. But, when algorithms are in-
troduced in institutional decision-making, individuals outsource their 
valuation processes to the algorithm. Their use in high frequency trad-
ing has become ubiquitous because machine learning allows algorithms 
to react to changes in the market quickly, leading to the delegation of 
responsibility to algorithms so companies can take advantage of their 
quick judgment.11 However, algorithms have been shown to be limited 
in their ability to develop and apply long-run knowledge and strategies 
in their investment strategies.12  The information bearing and allocative 
efficiency presumed in traditional markets do not hold in the case of 
algorithmic markets.13 
Current contract law presumes algorithms are mere tools, executing 
the will of their owners directly, with no ability to learn or decide. This 
is demonstrably not true of many algorithms that are used in contracts 
today. Some algorithmic contracts divorce critical aspects of decision-
making in contractual agreements from conscious determination by 
any individual. 
Two major concerns arise from this divorce. First, the use of algo-
rithms to determine terms in a contract creates the possibility for emer-
gence, that is, results that are not and indeed could not be foreseen by 
the algorithm’s creator. This creates situations where the entity respon-
sible for the algorithm does not know how it works and cannot predict 
its behavior. This knowledge gap is potentially hazardous for not just 
the company using the algorithm, but also for those who contract with 
such companies and society at large. Second, algorithms acting autono-
mously could choose strategies that amount to fraud or illegally dis-
criminatory practices. The law does not currently provide liability-
bearing conduit between the choices made by a sophisticated algorithm 
and the conscious intent of the individual or corporation using it. A con-
tract law that assumes all algorithms are mere tools cannot effectively 
contend with these problems.  
I argue that both contract law theory and pragmatic policy concerns 
require an approach to algorithmic contracts that considers algorithms 
as constructive agents for the purposes of contract formation. This pa-
per will proceed as follows: First, I will define algorithmic contracts, 
categorizing the different types of algorithmic contracts and discussing 
 
 11.  Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014) 
(discussing artificial intelligence technology and law). 
 12.  Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Mar-
kets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1612-14 (2015). 
 13.  Id. at 1616-17 (“As this Article demonstrates, this relationship between in-
formational and fundamental allocative efficiency can no longer be taken for 
granted in algorithmic markets. As a result, it is debatable whether today’s securities 
prices offer a thorough, substantive interpretation of corporate value. If not, the 
law’s wholesale reliance on prices for valuation becomes increasingly misplaced.”). 
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significant existing examples of algorithmic contracts. Second, I will use 
black box algorithmic contracts to demonstrate the formal and func-
tional limitations of current contract law, focusing on the inability of 
algorithmic contracts to contend with the assumptions behind the com-
ponent parts of traditional contracts, that is, mutual assent and consid-
eration. Finally, the Article proposes an agency approach to evaluating 
the role of algorithms in contract formation.  
Under the approach this Article advocates, contract law would 
prove a valuable tool in promoting algorithmic accountability. It would 
encourage the allocation of risk to the least cost avoider without requir-
ing extensive administrative agency action or litigation to work. Fur-
thermore, it could work with and serve as an inspiration for more spe-
cific reforms for specialized agencies for specific markets.  
II. DEFINING ALGORITHMIC CONTRACTS 
The existence of algorithms that must be understood as servants ra-
ther than mere tools justifies the creation and analysis of a distinct cat-
egory called “algorithmic contracts.” This Part creates a taxonomy for 
algorithmic contracts, and then discusses notable types of algorithmic 
contracts in action for illustrative use in later parts of this Article. In 
showing both the role algorithms play in contract formation as well as 
the emergence that currently characterizes many modern algorithms, 
and will continue to do so, this Part reveals the notion that algorithms 
must not be thought of as mere tools. Ultimately, the law of contracts 
must expressly account for the question of who takes responsibility for 
emergent acts by artificially intelligent entities.  
Machine learning enables sophisticated algorithms to be more sim-
ilar in function to a human employee with a task to achieve than a tool. 
In fact, across the financial industry, the field which has been making 
the most widespread use of algorithmic contracting, algorithms are be-
ginning to replace human workers outright. Eleven major banks cut 
100,000 banking jobs in 2015, equivalent to 10% of their combined 
staff.14 Much of this downsizing can be attributed to the use of algo-
rithms. For example, in early 2017 influential investment company 
Blackrock cut 40 “stock picker” roles to specifically to replace the hu-
man workers with algorithms.15 This change was openly highlighted be-
 
 14.   Oscar Williams-Grut, Banking’s ‘Uber Moment’ Is Already Happening—
100,000 Bankers Lost Their Jobs in 2015, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2015) 
http://www.businessinsider.de/banks-uber-moment-100000-bankers-fired-in-
2015-2015-12 [https://perma.cc/9HPY-26S9]. 
 15. Lucinda Shen, Robots Are Replacing Humans at All These Wall Street Firms, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 30, 2017, 5:13 PM), http://fortune.com/2017/03/30/blackrock-
robots-layoffs-artificial-intelligence-ai-hedge-fund/ [https://perma.cc/V5LT-
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cause algorithms are thought to be more reliable stock pickers than hu-
mans.  
In so far as it offers an explanation for algorithmic contracts at all, 
current contract law relies on two outmoded assumptions: (1) algo-
rithms are mere tools, and (2) even if they are not mere tools, a corpo-
ration is savvy enough to understand and anticipate all possible out-
comes of the algorithms’ actions. As early as 1992, a federal district 
court recognized that an algorithm was more than a “mere tool” because 
it was given the responsibility of weighing various factors in order to 
directly determine a motor carrier’s safety rating. 16 An algorithm is a 
servant when a person has entrusted it to achieve a given objective, 
within certain parameters.17 It has certain creator-imposed objectives 
and conditions, but it processes and understands details that the creator 
or user of the algorithm does not. A “mere tool,” then, is an item that is 
not delegated the responsibility to independently make determinations 
that change a person or company’s legal relationships.18  As long as con-
tract law relies on the outmoded assumptions that algorithms can only 
serve as mere tools, contracts made with algorithms will be of dubious 
enforceability, companies will not have adequate incentive to monitor 
the actions of their black box algorithms, and several types of fraud and 
market manipulation will be prevented from prosecution under the law.  
A. A Taxonomy of Algorithmic Contracts 
Algorithmic contracts are contracts in which one or more parties 
use an algorithm to determine whether to be bound or how to be bound. 
More specifically, algorithmic contracts are contracts that contain 
terms that were determined by algorithm rather than a person. An algo-
rithm is a process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other 
problem-solving operations, especially by a computer.19  The critical 
 
QDR7]. 
 16. Don Ray Drive-A-Way Co. of California, Inc. v. Skinner, 785 F. Supp. 198 
(D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the algorithm was not exempt from a FOIA request be-
cause it was not a tool but rather a substantive part of the regulation). 
 17.  Cf. The Golem of Prague, A TREASURY OF JEWISH FOLKLORE 431 (Nathan 
Ausubel ed., 1980). (Jewish legend describing how Rabbi Loew, a scholar and mys-
tic, created a golem, a creature made of clay in human form, to protect the Jewish 
community of Prague against attacks and false accusations. The golem could not 
speak and did exactly what it was told to do. Rabbi Loew made the golem lifeless 
every Friday at sundown.) 
 18. The term “mere tool” is used to differentiate algorithms that can be used 
only as tools from algorithms that have potential internal uses but also are delegated 
the responsibility to change their owner’s legal relationships with others. 
 19.  Defining algorithms is a difficult task, and the subject of scholarly inquiry, 
but there is broad consensus around a working definition similar to what I have 
stated above. E.g., Yuri Gurevich, What is an Algorithm? (Revised), CHURCH’S THESIS: 
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difference between an algorithm and a person determining terms is 
quite simply the fact that a computer rather than a conscious human 
being is implementing the rules. When a human makes a choice, ordi-
nary principles of liability and agency clearly link the acts of the human 
to the company she works for. No such link for the acts of algorithms 
exists at current contract law. When we have more complicated algo-
rithms, the ability of a human to anticipate the result of the algorithm is 
limited; indeed the reason why these algorithms are useful is because 
they can consider a breadth of data and number of conditions that no 
human could. However, decision-making algorithms can have emer-
gent properties. Algorithms can yield results arising as an outgrowth of 
complex causes and not analyzable simply as the sum of their inputs. 
Emergence, or the action of algorithms in manners not predictable by 
their developers, is a growing part of the algorithmic landscape with 
significant moral and practical implications.20 
To understand why the formation of an algorithmic contract is a 
hard question, we must understand the possible roles algorithms can 
play in contract formation. This task is required because different types 
of algorithmic contracts present different challenges to contract law. 
While some algorithmic contracts are readily handled by current con-
tract doctrine, others require additional interpretive work for contracts 
law to apply. There are several ways that a party can use an algorithm in 
contract formation. Algorithms can be employed in contract formation 
as either mere tools or artificial agents. This distinction is based on the 
predictability and complexity of the decision-making tasks assigned to 
the algorithm. Artificial agents themselves can be clear box, when inner 
components or logic are decipherable by humans, or black box, where 
the logic of the algorithm is functionally opaque. While courts and pol-
icy makers should be mindful of the specific characteristics of algorith-
mic contracts in their interpretation and enforcement, traditional con-
tract law provides adequate tools to address most algorithmic contracts. 
The rationale for the approach advocated in Part IV is that it explains 
 
LOGIC, MIND AND NATURE (A. Olszewski et al. eds., 2014), http://research.mi-
crosoft.com/en-us/um/people/gurevich/Opera/209a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PZ58-GYCJ]; Solon Barocas, Sophie Hood, and Malte Ziewitz, 
Governing Algorithms: A Provocation Piece (Mar. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245322 
[https://perma.cc/K3L5-7SH8]; Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About and Research-
ing Algorithms (Oct. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2515786 [https://perma.cc/4W5R-
TW6N]. 
 20.  Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 513, 532 
(2015) (“The literature tends to refer to this exciting potential as ‘autonomy’ or 
‘true learning,’ but I prefer ‘emergence.’ Emergence refers to unpredictably useful 
behavior and represents a kind of gold standard among many roboticists for reasons 
I will describe. Finally, robots, more so than other technology in our lives, have a 
social valence. They feel different to us, more like living agents.”). 
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the enforceability of all types of algorithmic contracts, from the simplest 
and most familiar to the most complex and futuristic. Coherence is a 
bedrock principal of contract law and legal reasoning generally.21 
Algorithmic contracts can be distinguished first by the role of the 
algorithm (tool or agent), then by the task assigned to the algorithm 
(gap-filling or negotiation), and finally, for negotiating algorithms, 
whether the algorithm is a black box algorithm or a clear box algorithm. 
There is a gradient of fit between algorithmic contracts and existing 
contract doctrine. Contracts where the algorithms help the parties as 
mere tools typically do not present any new issue for contract law. They 
are no different from a party using a calculator or a basic excel program 
to determine what to offer or accept. Agent algorithmic contracts acting 
as gap-fillers have clear analogues in existing contract law, such as 
agreements to pay market price on a given date. This type of algorithmic 
contract may enable and encourage excessively broad gaps. Existing 
doctrines such as incomplete contracts and illusory contracts can cabin 
this tendency.  
When algorithms act as negotiators, more interpretive work is re-
quired to show the fit with contract law. Black box algorithmic con-
tracts inherently introduce a gap between the objectively manifested in-
tent of the party using the algorithm and what the artificial agent does. 
Unlike in typical contracts, where we assume that a “sophisticated 
party” knows what it is doing enough to bind and be bound, black box 
algorithms by definition engage in emergent behavior that cannot be 
anticipated by a principal. The presumption of deference to general acts 
showing an intent to be bound, even of a sophisticated party using algo-
rithms, must be relaxed in the case of black box algorithmic contracts, 
and this relaxed presumption could potentially result in a contract being 
unenforceable.22 Clear box algorithmic contracts are an intermediate 
case because principals using clear box algorithms can anticipate their 
behaviors. Clear box algorithmic contracts present no formational im-
pediments if their behavior is foreseeable and limited in scope. Using a 
clear box algorithm to negotiate a contract may, in such cases, be enough 
to show intent to be bound to a reasonably firm universe of outcomes.  
B. Algorithmic Contracts in Action 
When described in general terms as in Part A, it can seem like algo-
rithmic contracts are creatures of the future. But in fact, they are already 
 
 21.  ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 38-42 (rev. ed. 2012). 
 22. A discussion of why black box algorithmic contracts pose a particularly 
substantial problem for contract law is found infra Part III. Infra Part IV suggests a 
roadmap to enforcement for black box algorithmic contracts. 
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in use, have been for over a decade, and are growing more widespread.23 
Commentators have discussed the limits of property law to address the 
complex problems presented by a digital, information age, and subse-
quent need for contract law in this area.24 This Part describes three ex-
amples of algorithmic contracts in action which complicate the applica-
tion of current contract law: high speed trading, online pricing, and 
Ethereum’s “smart contracts.”  
In particular, smart contracts illustrate that in some cases, the algo-
rithms used in contract formation do not reflect the considered, con-
sciously anticipated choices of their corporate users. By contrast, dy-
namic pricing, at least in its most familiar forms, is straightforward gap-
filling readily covered by current contract law. However, jurists and 
lawmakers ignore more complicated cases such as smart contracts and 
high frequency trading at their peril. Contract law will soon be forced 
to have as coherent an approach to these hard cases as  the simple cases. 
While litigation over the enforceability of hard algorithmic contract 
cases is currently rare, this is only due to the presence of repeat players, 
the norm of industry-specific regulation in high frequency trading, and 
the extreme marginality of the smart contract-using community. Algo-
rithmic contracting will spread to other areas of commerce, and when 
it does, breach of contract cases will create uncertainty when contracts 
are formed with black box algorithms.  
1. High Frequency Trading 
High frequency trading (HFT) is computerized trading of financial 
products using proprietary algorithms.25 There are two types of high 
frequency trading: execution trading and small opportunity trading. Ex-
ecution trading is when an order (often a large order) is executed via a 
computerized algorithm. The program is designed to get the best possi-
ble price. For example, it may split the order into smaller pieces and ex-
ecute at different times. The second type of high frequency trading is 
not executing a set order but looking for small trading opportunities in 
the market.26 Many scholars have highlighted the contrast between high 
frequency trading and traditional trading.27 
 
 23.  Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047, 
1047 (2001) (“The use of computer technology to ‘make contracts’ for humans is 
no longer mere prospect but reality.”). 
 24.  Christopher J. Cifrino, Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why Contract Law, 
Not Property Law, Must Be the Governing Paradigm in the Law of Virtual Worlds, 55 B.C. 
L. REV. 235, 254-64 (2014). 
 25.  High Frequency Trading, NASDAQ FINANCIAL GLOSSARY (May 10, 2017), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/h/high-frequency-trad-
ing#ixzz3xkqhACe4 [https://perma.cc/6BU6-XP6E]. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  E.g., Andrew J. Keller, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading After the 
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Faster is better when trading financial products.  Algorithms which 
make rapid decisions to exploit changes in the market can move in mil-
liseconds; the faster the response rate, the more potential to profit.28 The 
search for profit has led to the widespread adoption of high speed trad-
ing. Despite the relatively small number of entities able to invest in high 
frequency trading, even the most conservative estimates find that more 
than half of the volume of trading in American markets is high fre-
quency trading.29  
High frequency trading presents many market efficiency and fair-
ness concerns, with several commentators within the industry noting 
that HFT merely enables practices that otherwise would be illegal to 
proceed under cover of sophisticated proprietary algorithms.30 “The 
level of sophistication required makes it difficult for regulators around 
the world to catch those traders who are not operating legally,” said Pe-
ter Castellon, a partner at Proskauer Rose in London.31 “That’s what’s 
evil about high-frequency trading,” Castellon said, “and it’s very hard 
to catch because of the sophistication of the algorithms.”32 
Algorithmic trading has decreased the information-distributing 
function of the financial markets.33 Flash crashes are just the most ex-
treme illustration of this general phenomenon. The very purpose of 
HFT is to conceal information about the market from some actors in 
order to profit from their ignorance. While this tends to enrich some 
actors in the market, it does not promote efficiency, and in fact can lead 
to dangerous mistakes that no individual party intended. As practitioner 
Wallace C. Turbeville wrote in a recent Maryland Law Review article 
“the financial markets have become less efficient in the era of deregula-
 
Flash Crash of 2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1461-64 (2012) (describing the unique 
features of HFT in contrast to traditional trading). 
 28.  Nick Baumann, Too Fast to Fail: How High-Speed Trading Fuels Wall Street 
Disasters, MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2013, http://www.motherjones.com/poli-
tics/2013/02/high-frequency-trading-danger-risk-wall-street 
[https://perma.cc/PNX7-BH7D]. 
 29. Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 523, 574–75 (2014). 
 30.  Merritt B. Fox et. al., The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 191, 226-61 (2015) 
 31. Maureen Stapleton, Laws Need to Catch Up to High-Speed Trading, ABA 
JOURNAL (Aug. 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti-
cle/laws_need_to_catch_up_to_high_speed_trading/ [https://perma.cc/9N2E-
SMLZ]. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial 
Regulation: Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REV. 
1173, 1177-78 (2013) (“Contrary to commonly held beliefs, advances in infor-
mation technology and quantitative analysis have actually created asymmetries in 
information among trading market participants.”) 
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tion even though conventional wisdom dictates that advances in infor-
mation technology and quantitative analysis should have caused the op-
posite result.”34 
Ironically, the use of algorithms has reinvigorated the importance 
of physical space in trading.35 One interesting issue that has arisen out 
of high-frequency trading is the co-location of computer servers that 
give traders an advantage.36 The widespread use of HFT has made fi-
nancial markets less effective at their function of distributing infor-
mation, and has moved the actions of big players closer to pre-industrial 
age behavior of closeness to a resource, in this case, access to the inter-
net, rather than more sophisticated methods of wealth generation.37 
Chris Brummer has observed that “[n]owhere has disruptive tech-
nology had a more profound impact than in financial services—and yet 
nowhere do academics and policymakers lack a coherent theory of the 
phenomenon more, much less a coherent set of regulatory prescrip-
tions.”38 The overwhelming nature of the change in the way trading 
happens and the difficultly of regulatory responses stems in part from 
the technocratic approach that has dominated securities regulation in 
particular. Technocratic approaches can in fact be less effective than 
generalist approaches where the pace of technological development is 
so fast and so proprietary as to preempt true expertise on what is actu-
ally happening in the field to develop in government. By contrast, cor-
porate law is still strongly influenced by common law, which has al-
lowed corporate law to adapt to changing situations.  
While this Article’s approach to algorithmic contracts does not pur-
port to be a substitute for sector-specific financial regulation, making 
sense of the background private law of contract that governs algorith-
mic contracts will (1) provide guidance when rules fail and (2) aid in 
developing sector-specific approaches by describing a general approach 
that comports with the actual realities and potentials for contracting 
with algorithms. Charles Korsmo has observed that any regulatory 
strategy for high frequency trading should involve ensuring that “relia-
ble information regarding HFT is generated in close to real time,” “an 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Keller, supra note 29. 
 36.  Frank Pasquale, Law’s Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem of High-
Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2110 (2015). 
 37.  Co-location is the phenomenon of high speed traders aggressively purchasing the 
right to access locations close to stock exchanges to achieve quicker speeds. Some have linked 
the phenomenon to environmental harms, and it certainly disputes the popular notion of the 
internet being agnostic to energy and location. See Geoffrey Rogow, Colocation: The Root of 
All High Speed Trading Evil?, WALL ST. J. (Sep 20, 2012, 1:57 PM ET) 
https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/09/20/collocation-the-root-of-all-high-frequency-
trading-evil/ [https://perma.cc/639Q-QYGG]. 
 38.  Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 977 (2015). 
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evolving body of best practices regulation desired to reduce the sys-
temic risks posted by HFT”, and “strengthen liability for HFT and those 
who sponsor their access to the markets.”39 A clear backstop of contract 
rules would help achieve these goals even in absence of specific regula-
tion. Specific regulation is very difficult in an environment of constant 
innovation and proprietary algorithms. 
Furthermore, the need for general private law rules is particularly 
acute where innovation moves trading outside of traditional trading 
structures. Dark pools are non-public markets where orders are exe-
cuted without the scrutiny for regulated exchange trading.40 They are 
anonymous trading platforms for trading stock listed on public mar-
kets.42 Orders normally placed through an exchange are visible to the 
public and all other market participants, but an order or an indication 
of interest entered on a dark pool is revealed only to other dark pool 
participants.41 This gives dark pool participants access to information 
unavailable to the public.”42 Far from being the province of marginal ac-
tors, mainstream banks such as Golden Sachs participate in dark pools.43 
Even the basic characteristics of the entity to be regulated in high 
frequency trading have changed. As Tom C.W. Lin has put it, “changes 
in finance have transformed prevailing understandings of financial reg-
ulation’s main character, the investor. The investor has evolved from a 
person or group making a decision to a human-cyber hybrid, and regu-
lation should reflect the particular challenges presented by this real-
ity.”44 
High speed trading, as alluded to above, involves either black box or 
clear box algorithmic contracts. Algorithms, acting as agents for inves-
tors, determine the best way to make money pursuant to general objec-
tives, and will enact their objectives in such a way as to cover their 
tracks. The algorithms are sophisticated, but ultimately, what happens 
at each moment of trade is that the algorithm either offers a price based 
on its program and the current environment, or decides whether or not 
to accept an offer based on the same. The algorithm’s programming is 
hidden from whatever person or algorithm on the other side is trying to 
 
 39.  Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 523, 530 (2014). 
 40.  Luis A. Aguilar, Shedding Light on Dark Pools, SEC (Nov. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/shedding-light-on-dark-pools.html 
[https://perma.cc/8XYM-DJBX]. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity Markets—
From Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 563 (2015). 
 43.  Justin Baer and Scott Patterson, Goldman, Barclays, Credit Suisse Draw High-
Speed Trading Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2014, 6:01 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-sachs-faces-scrutiny-related-to-high-
speed-trading-hiring-1399634396 [https://perma.cc/AE7R-BAVA]. 
 44.  Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 682 (2013). 
Fall 2017 ALGORITHMIC CONTRACTS 141 
achieve. All that the other party sees is the offer of a price, or a rejection 
of an offer. 
Despite the prevalence of HFT and the huge amount of damage the 
practice has done to investors collectively, case law about contract law 
and HFT is practically nonexistent.45 On January 31, a huge SEC settle-
ment involving many top industry players saw the organizations admit-
ting guilt in deceiving participants in a dark pool by lying to them about 
whether the HFT would serve to mislead them when trading in the dark 
pool.46 The teachable lesson for crafting policy solutions for algorithmic 
contracts is that contract rules have impacts on the behaviors of com-
panies.47 The lack of a private law foundation for algorithmic contracts 
is preventing the agencies that regulate HFT from successfully pursing 
action against many potential wrongdoers.48 The ambiguity in contract 
law allows bad actors to have it both ways: (presumably) binding con-
tracts49 for sale of financial products without the level of intent in each 
individual trade to be brought into court for fraudulent trading strate-
gies. This status quo is untenable. 
2. Dynamic Pricing 
Dynamic pricing uses information about the market, product, and 
the buying party to set prices at the highest price a given buying party is 
willing to pay.50  
Dynamic pricing provides a fairly clear example of gap-filling algo-
rithmic contracts. Retailers use algorithms that take into account infor-
mation about the market and, increasingly, personalized information 
about the particular potential buyer to determine what price to offer. In 
most retailing situations, be it business to business or to consumer, the 
price is a “take it or leave it offer.” An algorithm does not appear to the 
buying party, only the term which is determined by an algorithm. Most 
 
 45.  Leading corporate law scholar Tom C. W. Lin did not cite a single case in 
his 2013 article describing high frequency trading and its legal discontents. Tom 
C.W. Lin, New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 682 (2013) 
 46.  Sarah N. Lynch, Barclays, Credit Suisse Strike Record Deals with SEC, NY over 
Dark Pools, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2016, 9:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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over-dark-pools-idUSKCN0V90UE [https://perma.cc/2HUZ-VLDV01M]. 
 47.  See Avery W. Katz, Contract Theory—Who Needs It?, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2043, 
2067-68 (2014) (discussing the underrated importance of considering contract 
theory for transactional lawyers). 
 48.  See infra Part IV. 
 49.  See infra Part III (arguing that the doctrine is ambiguous at best about the 
enforceability of black box algorithmic contracts.) 
 50.  Robert M. Weiss & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Online Dynamic Pricing: Efficiency, 
Equity and the Future of E-Commerce, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 1. (2001) (defining dy-
namic pricing and discussing its rise in the digital economy through reference to 
Amazon.com). 
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issues with these contracts may largely be addressed with reference to 
the case law on incomplete contracts. Some room for indeterminate 
rules has foundation in the Uniform Commercial Code, but there is the 
potential for complicated configurations to pose more difficult ques-
tions of incompleteness. Incomplete contracts have been the subject of 
much recent scholarship, and the law has difficulty determining when a 
contract is too incomplete to be enforceable.51 Scholars and courts differ 
as to how incomplete contracts should be handled. The classic view, and 
the one that still prevails in the courts, is that such contracts are unen-
forceable.52 Several scholars have discussed the significance of acknowl-
edging the reality of incomplete agreements at law.53 Specifically, some 
have found that courts should interpret incomplete contracts in a way 
that would have the most efficient consequences in terms of infor-
mation sharing.54  
 
 51.  See generally Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297 (2014) (discussing the merits of incomplete contracts and 
arguing that contract law should make them easier to complete); Avery W. Katz, 
Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169 
(2005) (discussing particular problems and potential solutions related to incomplete 
contracts between private parties); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefi-
nite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003) (arguing that since about half of all 
people behave as if reciprocity were an important motivation deliberately incom-
plete contracts that rely on self-enforcement through reciprocal fairness are fairly 
common, and may even be more efficient than the alternative of more complete, 
legally enforceable agreements). 
 52.  See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 106 (1989) (arguing for default rules 
that neither party would want in order to encourage parties to reveal information, 
and stating that “the common-law standard [is] that indefinite contracts are unen-
forceable”). 
 53.  See Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bar-
gain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (1986) (“I will suggest a theory of bargain 
based on the premise that parties assume a truncated risk distribution when they 
negotiate. . . . Under this theory, if the value of the contract at the time of dispute is 
outside the agreed-upon range, the parties are entitled to their expectations based 
on that range, leaving an excess to distribute. . . . Viewed in this light, the current 
doctrines of impossibility, mistake, and modification merge into the enforcement 
question of whether the value of the contract at the time of enforcement is within 
the range of values assented to.”). 
 54.  See generally JOHN FINNS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 307 (1980) 
 (“Suffice it to observe here that although promissory obligations do not come into 
being without some voluntary and intentional act such as might be said to manifest 
an ‘act of will’ on the part of the promisor, the occurrence of that act is only one of 
the several facts relevant to the emergence of the necessity which we call obligation, 
and has no special role in explaining the obligation of the performance promised. 
The need for a voluntary assumption of duty requires some independent justifica-
tion. Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that imposing no liability for precontrac-
tual reliance (i.e., reliance before there is a voluntary assumption of a duty) may lead 
to inefficient outcomes.”); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989) (“From an 
efficiency perspective, penalty default rules can be justified as a way to encourage 
Fall 2017 ALGORITHMIC CONTRACTS 143 
A classic example of dynamic pricing is the purchase of airline tick-
ets. If I plan to visit my parents in Atlanta this June, the cost of the ticket 
that I will be offered will vary based on variable factors, such as how 
close to the date of departure I decide to buy the ticket, whether or not 
there are major events happening in the city at the time I choose to go, 
and more fixed factors, such as how many flights there are between New 
York and Atlanta and the distance between the two cities. The airline, 
or the third party vendor selling the ticket, will use an algorithm to take 
these factors into account when offering me the ticket price. This exam-
ple takes place online, but dynamic pricing is spreading to the brick and 
mortar context, too.55 
Since as early as 2000, a feature of dynamic pricing has been the use 
of personal information to customize the price term to what a business’s 
algorithm suggests a consumer might accept.56 Contract is a liminal fea-
ture of interactions between consumers and businesses. Regardless of 
how intellectual or intellectual quasi-property rights like privacy57 set 
defaults, contract can still control the rights and responsibilities that 
most consumers face.58 While there are some limits to what can be 
agreed to, by and large in most jurisdictions as a matter of law and prac-
tice these contracts are immune to challenge.59 A consumer protection 
concern might arise where we begin to think that algorithms may allow 
businesses to set price terms to squeeze the maximum profit out of each 
consumer.60 Some have the intuition that violence is being done to basic 
 
the production of information. The very process of “contracting around” can reveal 
information to parties inside or outside the contract.”). 
 55.  Greg Bensinger, Amazon Plans Hundreds of Brick-and-Mortar Bookstores, Mall 
CEO Says, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2016, 6:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ama-
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the brick-and-mortar Seattle store will be the same as the online prices, which are 
known for dynamic pricing techniques). 
 56.  Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Dis-
crimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. 
& POL’Y 41, 48-49, 84, 88 (2014). 
 57.  See generally Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi Property, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. (2016) (“Privacy is quasi-property. Quasi-property is a relational entitlement 
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 58.  Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 
1705-06 (2009). 
 59.  See id. (“While the enforceability of these contracts is sometimes contested, 
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 60.  See David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online 
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principles of fairness, where one party has an algorithm that allows 
them to know the lowest price that an individual will accept, and the 
average consumer is operating with much less information about what 
price the company would accept.61  
The fairness of and potential for price discrimination in dynamic, 
digital pricing from data mining and processing has been examined in 
the literature from several perspectives. Some take it to be as an issue of 
competition and antitrust law.62 Some scholars address it as a funda-
mentally an ethical issue.63  It does not enter into our analysis of whether 
algorithmic contracts constitute contract formation. Exposing an un-
knowing consumer to a sophisticated algorithm tailoring its terms to 
the worst terms that consumer would accept would tend to remove all 
consumer surplus from transactions. This may justify intervention 
based on a policymaker’s interpretation of efficiency and justice. How-
ever, some, notably Professor Matthew A. Edwards, have argued that 
price discrimination actually could be desirable for consumers.64 As he 
 
Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (2016) (“I hypothesize that dif-
ferent experiences with online contracting have led some consumers to see con-
tracts—both online and offline—in distinctive ways. Experimenting on a large, na-
tionally representative, sample, this paper provides evidence of age-based and 
experience-based differences in views of consumer contract formation and breach. 
I show that younger subjects who have entered into more online contracts are like-
lier than older ones to think that contracts can be formed online, that digital con-
tracts are legitimate while oral contracts are not, and that contract law is unforgiv-
ing of breach. I argue that such individual differences in views of contract formation 
and enforceability might lead firms to discriminate among consumers. There is 
some evidence that businesses are already using variance in views of contract to in-
duce consumers to purchase goods they would not otherwise have.”) 
 61.  Cf. Aniko Hannak et al., Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-
commerce Web Sites, 2014 CONF. ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT, PROC., 305, 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ5Q-ABY2] (empirical study confirming the role of price dis-
crimination online, finding that there are “numerous instances of price steering and 
discrimination on a variety of top e-commerce sites”). 
 62.  E.g., Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big 
Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1330 (2015) (analyzing how sophisticated institu-
tions capitalize on consumer limitations and considering what might be done about 
it); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 
31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 405 (2014) (arguing that antitrust investigation should fo-
cus on how control of personal data by corporations can entrench monopoly power 
in an economy shaped increasingly by the power of “big data”). 
 63.  See Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating 
“Haves” from “Have-Nots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1414-15, 1455 (2014) 
(“Consumers should not be essentially punished based on who their friends are. This 
seems to offend basic morality and asks for consumers to base their social networks 
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56, at 68-98 (discussing ethics of price discrimination under the following head-
ings: freedom, consumer harm, antitrust, deceptiveness, unfairness, and social 
harm). 
 64.  See generally Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Con-
sumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559 (2006). 
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observes, “vigorous anti-equality stance is neither inimical to consumer 
rights nor incompatible with progressive critiques of laissez faire ap-
proaches to contract law.”65 This is a rich area of analysis that ultimately 
is an application of justice concerns about what contract law should do 
and how it should distribute power in society.66  Except for the consid-
erations of policy justifications for algorithmic contracts in Part III B, 
this Article will bracket this issue as not relevant to the issue of contract 
formation. Consumer-facing term algorithmic contracts are an applica-
tion of the general weakness of the “unequal bargaining power” defense 
to a fair contract where a consumer has willingly entered into the con-
tract.67 
While I’ve only discussed examples from dynamic contracting in 
consumer contracts, dynamic pricing works in business-to-business 
contract function in similar ways. The aim here is simply to illustrate 
how such contracts are formed with examples readily accessible to all 
readers. In fact, consumer contracts present unique issues, and this ar-
ticle is fundamentally about business ethics, that is, the incentives busi-
nesses have for algorithmic accountability. Consumer contracts present 
unique issues that business-to-business contracts do not, however. I 
have introduced this issue here but plan to more carefully examine al-
gorithmic contracts in the consumer contracts in future work. 
3. Ethereum and “Smart Contracts” 
The first two examples presented have reached mainstream society, 
but it is the example of lesser known “smart contracts” that truly illus-
trates the level of automation that is possible in creating contracts, thus 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract 
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41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (arguing that the dilemmas of paternalism are “inescap-
able” for the decisionmaker who wields power over others’ lives and that paternal-
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E.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 953 
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tracts to work that essentially provide for dismissal at will for almost any reason, a 
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of argument against interfering with consumer contracts in the social media medi-
ated climate has it that current technology has actually made it easier for consumers 
as a class to bargain with companies in the creation of form contracts than ever be-
fore, which throws into question the argument that legal intervention is necessary. 
Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power, 14 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 661 (2012) (arguing that social media has given consumers as a group more 
bargaining power against companies). 
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laying bare the inadequacy of  current contract law in addressing algo-
rithmic contracts. As Joshua Fairfield has discussed in recent work in 
the consumer context, decentralized applications like smart contracts 
could lead to widespread consumer usage of sophisticated algorithms to 
select for price and conditions.68 But there is a failure in the market to 
provide consumers with algorithms to help them make rational choices 
in a complex market, caused by the lack of incentive for current big 
plays to create and distribute such an application.69 This could be cor-
rected by new, innovative actors seeking to provide a useful service to 
consumers, much like search applications rose in the early days of the 
internet to help consumers achieve their goals in light of a surfeit of in-
formation online. 
Bitcoin has been the subject of debate and regulation as a cryptocur-
rency, but much of the discussion has centered around Bitcoin in its cur-
rent form rather than block chain technology more broadly, which en-
ables Bitcoin. Blockchain technology, which can roughly be described 
as a decentralized database, enables “trustless” transactions: value ex-
changes over computer networks that can be verified, monitored, and 
enforced without central institutions.70 The blockchain can be described 
as a public ledger that records every transaction that has ever been made 
and will ever be made on the bitcoin network, and a copy of this is dis-
tributed to every single user connected to the network. All users agree 
to abide to a certain set of procedures: the Bitcoin protocol.71 The block-
chain is an authentication and verification technology, enabling auto-
mated title transfers and ownership verification based on conditions.72 
No trust is needed, and these functions can be performed without 
trusted intermediaries subject to government regulation such as 
 
 68.  Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 
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65 DUKE L.J. 569, 574 (2015). 
 71.  Primavera De Filippi, Ethereum: Freenet or Skynet?, BERKMAN CENTER FOR 
INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Apr. 15, 2014), https://cyber.law.har-
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 72.  Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (un-
published), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/33WC-BGUR]. 
Fall 2017 ALGORITHMIC CONTRACTS 147 
banks.73 The borderless, arguably frictionless nature of the blockchain 
enables it to provide a cheap, fast infrastructure for exchanging units of 
value.74  
Ethereum builds upon the technology of Bitcoin to form a next gen-
eration smart contract and decentralized application platform.75 On top 
of a decentralized database, digital tokens, and encryption, it builds a 
Turing-complete scripting language that allows anyone to deploy their 
his or her application on top of the blockchain.76 This enables the devel-
opment of applications that operate autonomously on the blockchain.77 
Smart contracts are self-executing and, in theory, can be self-enforcing. 
One example of a smart contract type currently in use for a corporate 
bond with a specified par value, tenor, and coupon payment stream is a 
smart contract that automatically executes payments on the specified 
schedule to the assigned owner over the life of the bond.78 As this exam-
ple shows, smart contacts can be entirely written in code. 
A smart contract removes the need for trust between parties.79  
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  While Bitcoin proponents highlight the “frictionless” nature of the cur-
rency, a growing chorus critics have argued that there is substantial friction associ-
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Smart contracts are self-enforceable: the contract and the code are 
matching to one thing.80 The contract is defined by the code and is also 
automatically being enforced by the code that defined it.81 This creates 
the possibility of one decentralized application interacting and agreeing 
with another application.82  
What distinguishes smart contracts from other areas of algorithmic 
contract is the ability of Ethereum to create what are known as decen-
tralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). DAOs implement a consti-
tution that stipulates the governance of the organization. DAOs also im-
plement a system of equity allowing people to invest by purchasing 
some of their shares to help the organization achieve its objective. In-
stead of trusting an organization to operate by rules, one can encode a 
series of rules for behaviors for an organization that it will then be 
bound to follow. For an investor, this may in some ways be more desir-
able than investing in actual founders. As the Ethereum website puts it, 
the platform enables “applications that run exactly as programmed 
without any chance of downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party in-
terference.”83  
The most (in)famous example of a DAO is the entity known as “The 
DAO.”84 The DAO was launched with $150 million in crowdfunding in 
June 2016 to invest in cryptoccurrency startups.  Once it went live, in 
an incident known as the “DAO hack,” The DAO was immediately 
drained of US$50 million in cryptocurrency by a hacker that exploited 
weaknesses in the code.85 There was a debate within the community as 
to whether the “hacker” had precipitated properly executed smart con-
tracts that should be honored or whether it was a wrongful use of the 
Ethereum infrastructure that should not be allowed. This ideological 
debate split up the Ethereum community, and as of this writing, two 
different currencies with two different blockchains exist: Ethereum it-
self, which unwound the DAO hack and removed it from the block-
chain, and Ethereum classic, which did not. Perhaps of the ideological 
commitments of the investors into The DAO, legal action has not been 
brought to bear against anyone involved.  
In the next Part, I show that the contracts made by a DAO would 
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probably not be enforceable, because the intent of the investors in a 
DAO is too far removed from the contracting actions of the DAO.  In 
Part IV, I construct a legal argument for the enforceability of contracts 
formed by black box algorithms. 
III. BLACK BOX ALGORITHMIC CONTRACTS: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE 
LIMITS OF CURRENT CONTRACT LAW FOR ADDRESSING ALGORITHMIC 
CONTRACTS 
As discussed in Part II, DAOs present the clearest example of black 
box algorithmic contracts. They show that a contract law that does not 
specifically account for sophisticated, self-teaching, self-reliant algo-
rithms is fundamentally unstable in light of the next wave of contracts. 
In order to achieve the advantages of this type of corporate structure 
while checking the risks, we need a contract law that acknowledges that 
algorithms are more than mere tools and does not wrongly presume that 
sophisticated businesses can always predict the behavior of a sophisti-
cated algorithm. This Part discusses the inadequacy of current contract 
law to clearly find black box algorithmic contracts enforceable as a class.  
A. Black Box Algorithmic Contracts Are Probably Not Enforceable at 
Current Contract Law 
As Part II B illustrates, black box algorithmic contracts are already 
in use. As a social matter, they are serve the function of binding parties. 
After all, most contract disputes are handled in-between parties out of 
court. In the financial services industry, where black box algorithmic 
contracts are currently the most common, administrative agencies are 
the primary enforcers. But, enforceability questions about these con-
tracts remain. It is still not clear whether a party could go into court and 
demand enforcement of a black box algorithmic contract. As of this 
writing, no party has attempted to bring a case against the creator of a 
decentralized autonomous organization.86 
The commonly held presumption that electronic contracts are en-
forceable comes largely from corporate custom. There are some judicial 
holdings, not specifically about black box algorithmic contracts, which 
find all electronic contracts enforceable under the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act. However, when algorithmic contracting moves to a 
different business context outside of finance, litigation may erupt. As 
 
 86. May 12, 2017 Westlaw searches for cases containing the terms “decentral-
ized autonomous organizations” and “decentralized autonomous corporation” re-
turned zero results in federal jurisdictions and in all state jurisdictions. 
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Lea Shaver observed in the context of patent law, “litigation is the con-
tinuation of business strategy by other means.”87 As this Part will show, 
litigation against algorithmic contracts on the grounds that they are un-
enforceable is a loaded gun. It has gone unused thus far, but corpora-
tions will use it when it will serve their business interests to find a given 
set of black box algorithmic contracts unenforceable. 
To support the enforceability of black box algorithmic contracts, 
current contract law would need to adopt at least one of two legal fic-
tions: (1) black box algorithmic contracts are mere tools, and (2) sophis-
ticated corporations can anticipate the conduct of black box algorithms. 
The agency approach that this Article advocates in Part IV would also 
allow many black box algorithmic contracts to be enforced.  But this 
Article’s approach would have dual advantages over the status quo. It 
would reflect the reality of how black box algorithms work rather than 
willfully ignoring their characteristics. And it would provide a natural 
avenue of limiting potential for both irresponsible, unknowing use and 
willful abuse of algorithms in contract formation. 
In commercial law, the traditional requirements of mutual assent 
and consideration are sometimes relaxed due to assumptions about the 
sophistication of the parties.88 But omniscience cannot be imputed to 
even the most sophisticated business. Many empirical studies have 
shown that companies are not as savvy about their own contracting pol-
icies in areas such as arbitration as previously assumed.89 It has been ably 
argued that the sophisticated-unsophisticated dichotomy is doing an 
unjustifiable amount of work in contract law more generally, creating 
effectively two different contract laws for companies and individuals.90 
The argument for party sophistication is stretched to its breaking point 
in the case of black box algorithmic contracts. Black box algorithms can, 
by definition, move far beyond the intents and capacities of their au-
thorizing entities. The private law generally has not accounted for the 
new realities of artificial intelligence, but it is nimble enough to do so 
without fundamental reform.91 
 
 87.  Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891, 1926-47 (2012) (a historical discussion of the movement 
from relative peace to patent wars in the case of light bulb and smartphone patents). 
 88.  Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 
75 MO. L. REV. 493, 497 (2010). 
 89.  E.g., Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap “Sophis-
ticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 236 (2010); Kabir Masson, Paradox of 
Presumptions: Seller Warranties and Reliance Waivers in Commercial Contracts, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2009). 
 90.  See generally Meredith R. Miller, Party Sophistication and Value Pluralism in 
Contract, 29 TOURO L. REV. 659, 665 (2013); Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party 
Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 497 (2010). 
 91.  F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, 
and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1871 (2014). 
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There is a very strong argument for the unenforceability of algorith-
mic contracts. Traditionally, contracts reflect a meeting of the minds 
between two or more parties to alter the legal rights between them. As 
contractual doctrine evolved, it moved beyond attempting to evaluate 
whether or not the parties actually exchanged something fairly of value 
to whether or not there was a bargaining between the parties. The idea 
of the freedom of contract holds a special position in the American tra-
dition.92 Whether sophisticated or not, every competent party that is not 
under duress or one of the other very limited exceptions to enforcement 
has the power to choose what she sees fit to be bound by. The conscious, 
objectively manifested choice to agree to terms is a critical element of a 
contract. In other areas of law, the awareness by a conscious person is 
thought to have different status than an observation or processing by a 
machine.93  
The predominant approach to contract law considers a contract as 
fundamentally an expression of will, the conscious, objectively mani-
fested intention of two parties or more to be bound to terms.94  Note 
that the term of art “objective assent” requires a level of intersubjective 
 
 92.  E.g., Epstein, supra note 67, at 953-54 (“Freedom of contract is an aspect 
of individual liberty, every bit as much as freedom of speech, or freedom in the se-
lection of marriage partners or in the adoption of religious beliefs or affiliations. 
Just as it is regarded as prima facie unjust to abridge these liberties, so too is it pre-
sumptively unjust to abridge the economic liberties of individuals.”). 
 93.  Priscilla J. Smith, Nabiha Syed, David Thaw & Albert Wong, When Machines 
Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth 
Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 189-94 
(2011) (describing constitutional concerns with GPS technology due to the fact that 
it operates independently of humans). The Supreme Court rejected warrantless GPS 
tracking in U.S. v. Jones, with Justice Sotomayor’s influential concurring opinion in 
particular adopting an approach sensitive to whether a machine or human is watch-
ing. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (rea-
soning that determining whether government behavior constitutes a search re-
quires considering “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be 
recorded and aggregated” in such a manner). 
 94.  E.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269 (1986).  The alternative theory of contract finds that contractual obliga-
tion springs at law from the right to a remedy of one who has acted in justifiable 
reliance on another. E.g,. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
(1979); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract 
Law and the “Invisible Handshake”, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 927 (1985). There are also 
theories that combine these approaches in a social theory of contracts, arguing that 
contract springs from trust arising between individuals; an act of will is relevant but 
not determinative. E.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 307, 323-
24 (1980) (“Suffice it to observe here that although promissory obligations do not 
come into being without some voluntary and intentional act such as might be said 
to manifest an ‘act of will’ on the part of the promisor, the occurrence of that act is 
only one of the several facts relevant to the emergence of the necessity which we 
call obligation, and has no special role in explaining the obligation of the perfor-
mance promised.”). 
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awareness that blurs the line between the ordinary understanding of ob-
jective and subjective assent.95  Under Randy Barnett’s will-oriented 
and permissive view of form contracts, consenting to form contracts is 
not about making a promise that a party would need to have actually 
understood. Instead it is “about manifesting consent to be legally 
bound.”96 Conscious intent is on the non-corporate side of the form 
contract even when the individual chooses not to read lengthy terms 
and conditions; the person who agrees to the form contract has just de-
termined that rational ignorance is appropriate.97 Barnett finds that 
there are limits on what can be consented to in a form contract; terms 
which “exceed some bound of reasonableness” should not be considered 
part of the contract.98 Recently, several scholars have proposed a more 
limited scope for the enforceability of form contracts,99 but Barnett re-
flects the conventional view on this matter. 
Black box algorithmic contracts present a different type of problem 
than form contracts. Where those who accept form contracts can be said 
to be “rationally ignorant,” in black box algorithmic contracts there is 
no fixed set of things of to which a party can be said to be ignorant. What 
the algorithm is going to do is unknown to both parties. Agreements to 
agree, or to pursue an objective only when profitable, have never been 
considered contracts.100 While the algorithm itself is making more gran-
ular choices,  the idea that automated choice has legal standing different 
from conscious choice by some person undergirds many areas of law, 
such as the law governing government surveillance and autonomous 
 
 95. BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 24-25 (2012); 
see also Katz, supra note 47, at 2049-53 (“For purposes of contracts, law, or indeed 
any aspect of human communication, it is the interpersonal definition that is rele-
vant. In order for words to have communicative effect, the listener and hearer must 
speak the same language; functionally, they must share the same conventions re-
garding what sounds are used to refer to what concepts. Such conventions consti-
tute what the literary and legal critic Stanley Fish has labeled an “interpretive com-
munit[y].” Once one recognizes this point about the way that language works, the 
distinction between subjective and objective interpretation loses much of its bite, 
because whether two people share the same linguistic convention is a social fact that 
can be determined by interpersonally objective criteria.”). 
 96.  Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 
629-30 (2002). 
 97.  Id. at 640. 
 98.  Id. at 639. 
 99.  Kenneth K. Ching, What We Consent to When We Consent to Form Contracts: 
Market Price, 84 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2015) (“My argument is not just that form con-
tracts should be enforced at market price. It is that consent to form contracts should 
be construed as consent to pay market price.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Con-
tract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 363-66 (2011) 
(arguing that consumer exchange contracts should be excluded from the doctrine of 
adhesion). 
 100.  E.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917). 
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weaponry.101  
Like agents, algorithms must not be understood as mere extensions 
of the will of an individual or company. Robotics law expert Ryan Calo 
defines emergence as “unpredictably useful behavior” that “represents 
a kind of gold standard among many roboticists[].”102 Emergent behav-
ior accomplishes goals in ways the algorithm’s creators could not have 
predicted by learning from previous behavior and modifying its own 
program. An example of an algorithm demonstrating emergent behav-
ior would be a stock-picking algorithm in use by a financial institution. 
While the financial institution’s quantitative analyst might program the 
algorithm to achieve particular goals, the financial institution is unable 
to predict ex ante what stocks the algorithm will pick. If the instructions 
given to an algorithmic-agent by its principal are vague, they cannot be 
considered the level of objectively manifested intent necessary to 
ground a contractual promise. Furthermore, emergence is a widespread 
business goal in algorithm development and use, so the law must have a 
coherent and descriptive account of the liability profile in the case of 
algorithmic emergence.103 The concern is, unless the law incorporates 
an accurate view of the role algorithms play relative to their human 
principals, agreements that do not reflect the actual theoretical ground-
ing of contract law will be swept into contract law. What’s more, the gap 
between the role of contract law and improperly formed black box al-
gorithmic contracts has important negative policy effects, which will be 
discussed in Part III B.  
Black box algorithmic contracts present problems for both mutual 
assent and consideration. The Article will go over each of these issues in 
turn. 
Mutual assent is an agreement by both parties to a contract, usually 
in the form of offer and acceptance.104 In modern contract law, mutual 
assent is determined by an objective standard — that is, by the apparent 
 
 101.  Several authors have discussed the rise of autonomous weapons, and 
sources are remarkably consistent in their awareness that a choice made by an arti-
ficially intelligent agent is different from one made directly by a human principal. 
A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015); Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and 
Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1844-45 (2015). The question of how 
machine learning in the context of NSA surveillance is different from reading by a 
human government is also a live debate. 
 102. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 513, 532 
(2015). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (defining 
contract as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a 
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty”) 
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intention of the parties as manifested by their actions.105 But the objec-
tive intent at issue in the formation of a contract is not the general in-
tention to make some kind of contract, or to come to some kind of terms 
with another party to reach an objective.106 It is objective manifestation 
of intent to be bound by a contract with particular terms.107  
In the traditional account of bilateral contracts, one party makes an 
offer and the other party evaluates it and then chooses to accept or 
deny.108 However, in the case of a black box algorithmic contract, where 
one party uses an algorithm to choose, for example, price and who to 
ask to contract with, the offeror (that is, the company or individual us-
ing the algorithm) is not directly offering. Rather, an automated agent is 
offering on behalf of the offeror, in a combination that the offeror may 
or may not have consciously considered.109 The question is: is the man-
ifested intent of a party to use an algorithm to select prices and contrac-
tual terms for them the same thing as actually, objectively, and mani-
festly assenting to the actual contracts the algorithm selects? Not 
necessarily. The algorithm as agent theory mediates between the intent 
of the creator of the algorithm and the acts of the algorithm. If the algo-
rithm is acting within the parameters of what the offeror specifically 
planned for it to do, the algorithm acting on behalf of the offeror is act-
ing as a conduit for the objective intent of the offeror to be bound. To 
put it another way, the extent to which the offeror can be said to be 
agreeing to a black box algorithmic contract is merely an illusory prom-
ise. When illusory promises are all that support a purported bilateral 
contract, there is no mutuality of obligation and thus no contract. A new 
technology should not enable contracting parties to end-run around the 
bedrock principle of contract law; parties should agree to be bound by 
promises, but only those that are non-illusory and non-gratuitous.110 
The instinct of many operating with more limited knowledge of al-
gorithms in society is to assume a party using an algorithm has an idea 
 
 105.  K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE 
L.J. 779, 783 (1939); K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Ac-
ceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1 (1938). 
 106.  See Robert A. Prentice, “Law” & Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
881, 909 (2007); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1979). 
 107.  See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract For-
mation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428-29 (2000). 
 108.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (Am. Law Inst. 1932). 
 109.  For the purposes of this discussion we will take the perspective that the 
contracting party is the offeror. The same analysis holds for when an algorithm 
serves as the agent of the accepting party to a contract; that is, determining whom 
to contract with, which terms to accept, and whether to counteroffer. 
 110.  See Prentice, supra note 106, at 909; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative 
Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,32 (1979) (describing substantive and procedural 
grounds for enforcing donative promises and finding that in general, donative 
promises should not be enforced outside of proven reliance). 
Fall 2017 ALGORITHMIC CONTRACTS 155 
of what it will do on its behalf.  However, this is based on the idea of 
algorithms as mere tools, like a calculator. The potential of Ethereum 
and the inscrutable sources of the flash crashes, as discussed in Part II B, 
are real world examples of how far the behaviors chosen by algorithms 
can stray from the intentions of any conscious person. In agency law, 
principal is not always bound by the actions of their agents; the agents 
might act in a way that goes directly contrary to the stated goals and 
interests of the principles. The principal is usually liable for the mistakes 
the agent makes because the principal assumed such a risk by opting to 
use an agent in the first place. But assumption of risk is a concept from 
tort, and should be analyzed as such.  If the offeror using a black box 
algorithmic contract is bound by a contract that goes beyond the scope 
reasonably anticipated by the offeror, or the offeror gave the algorithm 
so broad an objective, such as “do X it if it is within my business interest” 
that it demonstrates no intent to be bound by a particular type of con-
tract, there is a strong argument that there is no objective manifestation 
of intent to contract in any particular black box algorithmic contract. “ 
The investors in The DAO are a great example of this. Prior to the 
DAO hack, the New York Times described the attitude of the investors 
in the DAO as “the digital equivalent of buying into a bakery with no 
baker, no menu and no assurance that the ovens will even be delivered. 
But among the crowd that has invested, faith in the computer code that 
governs the project appears strong enough to override all those con-
cerns”111 The person who used the algorithm is still liable for the actions 
of the algorithm in tort. However, the broad sense that “a party used an 
algorithm to make a contract, but they basically knew what was going 
to happen” does not rise to the level of mutual assent in contract.  
Some properly formed contracts find parties agreeing to an algo-
rithm or a future market price. However, using a black box algorithm to 
agree to the agreement is different. In the first case, a term being agreed 
to is, at least at the time of the formation of the contract, undetermined. 
In the case of black box algorithmic contracts, the choice to be bound 
itself is indeterminate, even if what is agreed upon is fixed. When what 
the algorithm will agree to cannot be determined at the time the com-
pany puts the algorithm into use, the company has not objectively man-
ifested the intent to be bound at a sufficient level of specificity to form 
an enforceable contract. 
The second area of contractual formation that black box algorithmic 
contracts call into question is consideration. Consideration is some-
thing (such as an act, a forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for 
 
 111. Nathaniel Popper, A Venture Fund With Plenty of Virtual Capital, but No Cap-
italist, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/busi-
ness/dealbook/crypto-ether-bitcoin-currency.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/4W25-FKXK]. 
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and received by a promisor from a promisee; that which motivates a 
person to do something, especially an agreement to engage in a legal 
act.112 Consideration, or a substitute such as promissory estoppel, is nec-
essary for an agreement to be enforceable. So, even if a black box algo-
rithmic contract can be said to be grounded on mutual assent, if there is 
no consideration, the contract is non-enforceable.113 
Modern contracts scholars have adopted the bargain theory of con-
tract in place of the benefit-detriment model:114 as long as there was a 
bargaining process between the two parties, what arises from it is a con-
tract. 115 When considering black box algorithmic contracts under this 
theory, it is doctrinally relevant that the offeror is not bargaining, it is 
the algorithm bargaining. This attenuates the issue because both parties 
can talk about what should be in the algorithm, what it should do, when 
to accept results, etc. The agreement to an algorithm presumes that the 
algorithm will reach results that are amenable. In a black box algorith-
mic contract, there is an agreement to agree rather than a true bargain 
between humans. 
Consideration is a particularly thorny problem for black box con-
tracts that feature algorithms on both sides of the negotiation. When al-
gorithms are doing the bargaining rather than the offeror and accepting 
party, it’s less clear that we can say that it is a bargained for agreement. 
Perhaps there is a rational benefit and detriment, but the law has already 
moved away from that approach to consideration.  
Ultimately, there are serious concerns about whether the bargain 
theory of contract can be applied to black box algorithmic contracts. 
Just running through a suite of examples above creates the provocation 
that it might not. Given that black box algorithmic contracts create the 
potential that the very low bar of bargaining not be met in a large range 
of business-to-business agreements, this supports the idea that the the-
oretical infrastructure for contract law needs tweaking to apply consist-
ently to black box algorithmic contracts. 
There are several defenses to contractual formation that might arise 
in the case of a black box algorithmic contract. These include the ex-
cuses for non-performance (mistake, misrepresentation, frustration of 
 
 112.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71, 81 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“An 
agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons. 
A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a per-
formance or to exchange performances.”) 
 115.  Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of Consider-
ation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1878-79 (2001); Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated 
Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 104 (2000); Melvin Aron Eisen-
berg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825 (1997); 
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purpose, impossibility, impracticability, illegality, unclean hands, un-
conscionability, accord, and satisfaction) and the defenses against for-
mation (lack of capacity, duress, undue influence, and non est factum).116 
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate whether algorithmic contracts 
are contracts, and if they are, how they should be interpreted. To this 
end, the Article will not consider defenses to contract.117  
B. Policy Reasons to Place Limits on the Enforceability of Algorithmic 
Contracts 
Contract scholarship has been critiqued for being too theoretical 
and divorced from the realities of contracts in action.118 The challenge 
to contract law presented by black box algorithmic contracts bridges 
this gap between theory and practice. The previous Part has shown that 
black box algorithmic contracts are probably not enforceable under 
current contract doctrine. This Part will show how when black box al-
gorithmic contracts fail as a matter of formality, they demonstrate real 
policy concerns about the prospect of negating all black box algorithmic 
contracts without additional interpretive work. By accounting for this 
connection, common law reasoning can support the technocratic, ad-
ministrative approach favored in the modern era.119  
As Melvin Eisenberg put it, “[I]nterpretation cannot possibly be 
 
 116.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS CH. 6-8, 11 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
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scionability as the “Law of the Poor”, 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1395 (2014) (chronicling 
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 119.  David Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1044, 1046 
(1997) (discussing how the traditional role common of law courts has changed and 
modern attitudes towards the limitations of courts and the rise of faith in a techno-
cratic, specialist state). 
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more accurate with less information and less accurate with more infor-
mation.”120 Formation theory gives us reason to doubt that algorithmic 
contracts are properly formed at law. The evaluation of practical con-
siderations in this Part adds to the argument for an approach to enforc-
ing algorithmic contracts that considers the context of their formation. 
The approach that I advocate for in Part IV fills the gap in formation by 
allowing rules imported from agency law to fill the “objective intent” 
gap. Failing to do so harms social and economic efficiency by allowing 
some actors to hoard and conceal information. Furthermore, the status 
quo creates an incentive for parties to both hoard the information and 
not mine the social implications of the information.  
1. Valuation Principle 
Black box algorithmic contracts are uniquely able to undermine the 
use of contracts as a principle for evaluating the demonstrated prefer-
ences of people beyond market price valuation.121 Contracts show how 
people value items. A contracting to sell a house to B for 1000 units 
shows that A values the 1000 units more than the house. A and B bring 
their own impressions, biography, and context to the transaction. 1000 
may represent the market value, but that is likely not the sole reason B 
chose to buy that house.  Perhaps B strongly prefers brick houses and 
this house was one of very few brick houses in the area, or perhaps she 
liked the particular community because of the access to hiking. A may 
strongly value the house, perhaps at even more than 1000 units, but may 
have to leave the area for other reasons.  
This classic, intuitive illustration shows that contracts mean more 
than just an indication of what market prices are.122 Contracts are a 
venue through which individuals can express preferences that are not 
grounded in “rationalist” market pricing. In this way, they can promote 
information sharing in society.123 Contract doctrine reflects this in its 
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& PUB. POL’Y 127, 127-28 (2009) (“Law and economics and democracy are not en-
emies, but I contend that legal realism—or its lingering aftershocks—causes law 
and economics to be more technocratic and less democratic than necessary. While 
legal realism as a movement itself may be dead, it rules us from the grave.”). 
 123.  See Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and 
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 566-67 (2006) 
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transition from the benefit-detriment theory of contract, in which 
courts used to try to objectively analyze whether the deal was “fair,” to 
an acknowledgment of the fact that contract law is all about accepting 
the actual preferences of individuals. There is a presumption among 
non-specialists that algorithms are typically right, but that is far from 
true, at least in the ordinary sense of “rightness.”124  Algorithms are, by 
definition, bound by the terms, context, and limitations of their human 
programmers. To put it another way, if the question the algorithm is 
told to solve is “wrong,” the algorithm will not necessarily be able to 
correct the question, and thus will produce a “wrong” answer. The law 
needs to make provisions in line with how algorithms really work. If a 
given firm’s programmers and their supervisors do not value a particu-
lar type of information, it will not be evaluated, even if the corporation 
is the sole holder of the information. If the corporation’s lawyers deter-
mine that understanding certain aspects of the data available to the cor-
poration would expose the corporation to liability, the corporation may 
actively seek to make sure that data is not processed in a way that pro-
motes understanding of the aforementioned information.  
When we take the accountability to the conscious preferences of in-
dividuals out of the equation, as with black box algorithmic contracts, 
we lose the use of contracts as an indicator of what humans or compa-
nies consciously prefer. The contract becomes just another predictor of 
actual preferences (like price). Contracts are a unique area of law where 
an individual’s objective acts to reveal a preference are given prece-
dence. The concept of e-governance is based on the idea that under-
standing the experiences and opinions of the public will allow for better 
policy decision-making;125 contract law has the same function in the pri-
vate sector. To uphold what an algorithm agreed to, especially when it 
conflicts with or is unrelated to an actual objective intent of the princi-
pal, is not just ethically questionable, but also robs society of a valuable, 
unique source of information about social and business norms. 
 
(“[T]he common law of contracts . . . attempts in various ways to regulate the infor-
mation that parties exchange.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1645, 1648-49 (2003) (on the Disclosure Principle, which states that 
“the law should require disclosure of material facts except in those classes of cases 
in which a requirement of disclosure would entail significant efficiency costs”); An-
thony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEG. 
STUDIES 1, 13-14 (1978) (on the information distributive functions of contracts). 
 124. See Tarleton Gillespie, Can an Algorithm Be Wrong?, LIMN (2012) 
http://limn.it/can-an-algorithm-be-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/CBB6-NK4C] (on 
the Twitter Trends algorithm and #occupywallstreet). 
 125.  See generally BETH NOVECK, SMART CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE: THE 
TECHNOLOGIES OF EXPERTISE AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING (2015). 
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2. Uncertainty 
The use of algorithms creates a great deal of uncertainty. Sophisti-
cated algorithms can quickly find connections that humans would be 
unlikely or unable to ascertain, but can also create problems that hu-
mans are unlikely to foresee.126 This is a rational, calculated risk on the 
part of any person or business who decides to use an algorithm in mak-
ing decisions. It is certainly not the aim of this Article to argue that busi-
nesses should stop using these algorithms or be regulated when they use 
algorithms for internal decision-making.127 Businesses and individual 
can manage their own risks, and when their risk-taking impacts others, 
tort law can allow people to recover in some cases. However, the uncer-
tainty surrounding algorithmic contracts calls for reconsideration of 
the borders of contract law.  
The reality of how many firms use algorithms internally is best de-
scribed by the much-maligned algebra method “guess and check.” In-
stead of having any idea of how a database may be used, firms just poke 
around looking for patterns. And once patterns are found, they operate 
based on them.128  It is unlikely that this way of using data and algo-
 
 126.  SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE 
SHOULD WORRY) 129-45 (2012) (discussing the limitations to how algorithms can 
help us to know things and the benefits of uncertainty); Ian Bogost, The Cathedral of 
Computation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technol-
ogy/archive/2015/01/the-cathedral-of-computation/384300 
[https://perma.cc/BCK3-HFTF] (discussing the rightness of algorithms as an article 
of faith in modern society and their fallibility in reality); Jenna Burrell, How the Ma-
chine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, 1 (Sep. 15, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2660674 [https://perma.cc/5733-76WF] (identifying three types of 
opacity associated with algorithms: 1) opacity as intentional corporate or state se-
crecy (2) opacity as technical illiteracy, and (3) an opacity that arises from the char-
acteristics of machine learning algorithms and the scale required to apply them use-
fully). 
 127.  This is a rich and growing area of research, with spirited empirical and 
theoretical arguments about whether and how internal usage of algorithms should 
be regulated. See generally, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE 
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Zeynep 
Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms Beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of Com-
putational Agency, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J.  203 (2015). It is important to note here that 
even the most extreme arguments for data as constitutionally protected speech, see 
Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 64 (2014) (presenting the con-
clusion that “data should receive speech protection any time it is regulated as infor-
mation”), do not limit the analysis in this Article. It is settled law that contracts are 
not speech, but “legal acts.” See, e.g., Coghlan v. S. Carolina R.R. Co., 142 U.S. 101, 
111 (1891) (referring to contracts as legal acts). 
 128.  Charles Vaccaro, Look Before You Leap into Predictive Coding: An Argument for 
a Cautious Approach to Utilizing Predictive Coding, 41 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
298, 318-19 (2015) (discussing “garbage in garbage out” and the principle that 
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rithms will change without external pressure, given that so many suc-
cessful results have come from it and that access to many databases is 
severely limited and proprietary.129 This is true of the black box algo-
rithms used in high speed trading.130  
Algorithms are increasingly being used to develop culture,131 for ex-
ample, algorithms curate newsfeeds on most social platforms and bot 
posters on Twitter and Reddit automate entertainment for users.  Cul-
ture is an area where it is less obvious than in finance when a “crash” 
has occurred, and how to fix one if one were to happen. No money is 
lost when there is a culture crash, but there may be other losses to soci-
ety such as chilling effects for individuals vis-à-vis expressing contro-
versial opinions and reinforcement of outmoded and socially undesira-
ble stereotypes. 
The uncertainty problem becomes untenable when many actors are 
using algorithms to conduct transactions. In Property as the Law of Things, 
Henry Smith makes the argument that the reason why property law 
works so well is that it leaves to the owner’s discretion many aspects of 
use and enjoyment and only steps in on the borders, where individuals 
seek to sell their property, or one of the sticks that compose it (like, ac-
cess to a piece of land).132 The law can come in and regulate at the bor-
ders. 
When an algorithm has unpredictable results because a business is 
not sure what causes the algorithm to have positive results, the business 
can manage the risk presented by the algorithm internally. The problem 
with using algorithms to reallocate legal rights between parties is that 
since the algorithms are not operating within anyone’s domain, no one 
entity is keeping track of and minimizing potential risks for the unan-
ticipated negative results of the pervasive use of algorithms. When no-
body is responsible for managing the risk, the risk continues unabated. 
And that can lead to crises where nobody understands what went 
wrong. An example of this is the Flash Crashes, but it is possible every-
where black box algorithmic contracts are found. Someone needs to 
 
most lawyers and non-quantitative business people do not understand the predic-
tive limitations of algorithms). 
 129.  Astrid Mager, Algorithmic Ideology: How Capitalist Society Shapes Search En-
gines, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y. 769, 779-82 (2012). 
 130. See Yadav, supra note 13, at 1649. (“Trading firms develop their own, in-
house proprietary models. Regarded as the ‘secret sauce’ for success, firms face 
competitive pressures to ensure that their particular algorithm emerges a winner by 
virtue of its superior, speedier, and smarter programming.”). 
 131.  See Tarleton Gillespie, #trendingistrending: When Algorithms Become Culture, 
in ALGORITHMIC CULTURES: ESSAYS OF MEANING, PERFORMANCE AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 52-75 (Robert Seyfert & Jonathan Roberge eds., 2016). 
 132. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691 
(2012). 
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have responsibility. The place to insert regulatory liability and incen-
tives is at the borders where transactions between parties are being 
made. 
3. Repository of Responsibility 
More and more significant tasks are being delegated to algorithms, 
and these are tasks not just of increasing complexity, but tasks that re-
quire judgment (both financial and moral). It needs to be made clear 
who has responsibility for judgments made by artificial agents. 
Delegating moral responsibility has meaning in society. This is true 
not just of criminal law, but also of tort law.133 Even when we move be-
yond the responsibility that can legitimately be claimed in a contract, 
the way that we understand algorithms at law must be compatible in 
lodging the responsibility of specific individuals or companies in a way 
that makes intuitive sense. The use of algorithms in agreements presents 
unique incentives and mechanisms for avoidance of accountability by 
the actors that use them.134 
4. Social Welfare 
Black box algorithmic agreements can enable price discrimination 
and allow companies with market power to avoid taking responsibility 
for external harms.135 They also can enable contracting contexts that 
 
 133.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 917, 918-19 (2010) (“As the law of private and privately redressable wrongs, 
tort law is rightly treated as a cornerstone of legal education along with criminal 
law (the law of public and publicly redressable wrongs) and contract law (the law of 
consensually defined duties). Looked at through the lens of litigation, Torts is about 
the wrongs that a private litigant must establish to entitle her to a court’s assistance 
in obtaining a remedy and the remedies that will be made available to her. Looked 
at through the lens of daily life, Torts is about which duties of noninjury owed to 
others are counted as legal duties and what sorts of remedial obligations one will 
incur for failing to conduct oneself in accordance with those duties.”). 
 134.  See, e.g., Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 
1777, 1779 (2014) (“[T]hese tools also raise concerns about privacy and autonomy 
as against companies, governments, and malicious actors . . . . Legal regimes can 
support this design by clarifying rights and responsibilities with respect to infor-
mation, access, and control. Tort law, contract law, and the hybrid that is products 
liability will confront some of the failures of this design. As this Article has argued, 
the result could be expanded duties for sellers.”); Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big 
Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 577-83 (2014) (evaluating the sufficiency of intellec-
tual property as an avenue for encouraging “big data” producers to disclose how 
they “collect, organize, and transform valuable sources of data”). 
 135.  Dennis D. Hirsch, The Glass House Effect: Big Data, the New Oil, and the Power 
of Analogy, 66 ME. L. REV. 373, 375-76 (2014) (comparing the management of big 
data to the management of big oil due to the common features of high negative ex-
ternalities and high market power in both fields). 
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would enable companies to take a lot of surplus.136 Furthermore, as An-
drea M. Matwyshyn’s recent article illustrates, there is a strong, rein-
forcing connection between contract law norms and the law’s ability to 
protect consumer privacy against the interest of sophisticated business 
actors.137  
While conceiving of contact law as a mechanism for distributive jus-
tice has fallen out of fashion,138 there is a tradition of strong works that 
support being critical of a type of contract that systemically allows pow-
erful parties to consume surplus and impose negative externalities on 
society.139  However, recently, there has been a reemergence of interest 
in using other parts of common law to correct for the unjust potential 
of some powerful parties in society using sophisticated algorithms and 
big data to extract rents from less sophisticated parties.140 
The use of black box algorithmic contracts could enrich powerful 
parties and disempower the weak under the guise of “objective” algo-
rithms.141 To the extent that society wants to create fair rules of play that 
do not effectively take from A to give to B, this justifies government ac-
tion.  
 
 136. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World Wide Web: 
Reforming Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431, 1436 
(2014) (“Based on our statistical findings in Parts I, II, and III, which demonstrate 
that TOUs are systematically unfair and imbalanced, we propose procedural and 
substantive reforms in Part IV that will fortify the rights of consumers entering into 
these adhesive TOUs.”); Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contract in Context 
and Contract As Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 552 (2010); Omer Tene & 
Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age of Big Data, 11 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 351, 352-53 (2013). 
 137.  Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, the Hacker Way, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2013) (“[This Article] challenges three commonly held misconceptions in privacy 
literature regarding the relationship between contract and data protection—the 
propertization fatalism, the economic value fatalism, and the displacement fatal-
ism—and argues in favor of embracing contract law as a way to enhance consumer 
privacy.”). 
 138.  See Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 2077, 2118 (2014) (commenting on the lack of analysis of distributive 
justice and feminist perspectives in three influential new contracts treatises). 
 139.  See e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and 
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991); Duncan Ken-
nedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Refer-
ence to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); 
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980). 
 140.  E.g., Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor 
You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly, 67 ALA. L. REV. 135, 179-187 
(2015) (arguing that “rather than discouraging the use of restrictive software li-
censes, the law should adapt to better facilitate such licenses,” and noting that per-
fect price discrimination will likely help the poor). 
 141. See generally Pasquale, supra note 127 (chronicling the ways in which pro-
prietary algorithms control our world and reinforce wealth and power discrepan-
cies in society). 
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Algorithms also do not evolve in response to changing circum-
stances in the same way humans do. It may be that the use of algorithms 
could lead to a functional freezing of today’s social hierarchies and per-
ceptions in a more neutral-seeming package. Making the aims of algo-
rithms explicit, as Part IV’s proposal incentivizes, would allow relevant 
actors and regulators the opportunity to be more thoughtful in these 
choices. 
IV. AN AGENCY APPROACH TO ALGORITHMIC CONTRACTS 
This Part will describe an agency approach to the formation of al-
gorithmic contracts, describe potential ways forward using this ap-
proach for government agencies, courts, and stakeholders, and discuss 
the implications of this Article for legal theory.  
A. Artificial Agents and Contract Law 
Companies using algorithms to make contracts have a more general 
intent than is ordinarily required to form a contract.142 The company 
does not have the specific, objectively manifested intent to agree to the 
contracts the algorithm chooses when the algorithm is sufficiently com-
plex to have emergent behavior and has been delegated the responsibil-
ity to select and enter into contractual relation on behalf of the com-
pany.143  While this case has not be litigated, analogous cases in other 
areas of law support this result. For example in intellectual property law, 
algorithms have not been found able to vest ownership in a company 
using it under the work-for-hire doctrine, because an algorithm is not a 
person legally competent to turn over the rights to its work to its em-
ployer.144 Because an algorithm is not a person, it lacks the legal interest 
to make a contract on its own behalf. However, algorithms can act on 
 
 142. See e.g., Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts, 9 
Harv. J. L. Tech 25, 47-50 (1996) (“[A]n autonomous computer is capable of altering 
its stored program and developing new instructions in response to information it 
acquires in the course of trading. Since the program changes over time, without any 
human intervention, it would be very difficult to characterize it as the embodiment 
or expression of human intention. Hence, the doctrine as it now stands would deny 
validity to agreements generated by an autonomous computer.”). 
 143.  Id. 
 144. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent 
Owner, 2012 Stan. Tech. L.R. 5, 68 (2012) (“As the work made for hire provisions 
of the U.S. Copyright Act are currently drafted, however, they cannot be stretched 
to cover procedurally generated works. Such works do not fall under the definition 
of ‘work made for hire’ in section 101(1), because the relationship between the pro-
grammer and the authoring code is not an employment relationship in the agency 
sense, which the Supreme Court has interpreted the provision to contemplate. Nor 
do they fall under the definition in section 101(2), because they are not among the 
nine categories of commissioned works specified there.”). 
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behalf of persons to alter their interests. Political scientist Sam Lehman-
Wilzig has observed that there are several possible analogous types of 
accountability for algorithms acting on behalf of humans, including 
product liability, dangerous animals, slavery, diminished capacity, chil-
dren, agency, and personhood.145  
I propose that the best way to think about the accountability model 
for algorithmic contracts is to cast the algorithms as constructive agents 
for the company. The algorithms are acting as human agents would, so 
agency law is an appropriate source of law, but must be tempered by the 
“constructive” qualification because algorithms are not persons and so 
cannot be regarded as human agents. Agency law allows the law to im-
pute knowledge and intent to principals who are not directly involved 
in tasks, including forming contracts146 Principals can authorize their 
agents formally, by implication, or by ratification, i.e., accepting the 
benefits of the acts of the agent after the agent has acted.147  
The law should treat the intent and knowledge level of companies 
or individuals who use algorithms for contracting in the same way as 
the law would treat the intent and knowledge level of a principal in 
agency law. I will set aside, for the moment, whether or not algorithms 
can be persons or agents in the traditional sense. Nothing in this analysis 
suggests that algorithms could or should be considered persons. Algo-
rithms can be agents without legal personality, or quasi-agents for the 
purpose of understanding the legal obligations of their principles.148  
What is at stake here is the accountability situation faced by the princi-
ples using the algorithms. 
This approach has firm grounding in current contract law, but it 
pushes the law slightly further by formally making enforceability turn 
on these agency principles. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 
adopted by 47 states, includes an understanding of algorithms as 
agents.149 UETA facilitates the creation of algorithmic contracts by al-
lowing for such contracts to be formed through electronic records and 
 
 145. Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig, Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a Legal Definition of 
Artificial Intelligence, 13 FUTURES 442, 447-553 (1981). 
 146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006). 
 147.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 2.03, 4.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006). 
 148.  Samir Chopra & Laurence White, Artificial Agents and the Contracting Prob-
lem: A Solution Via an Agency Analysis, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y, 363, 368-380 
(“The first four potential solutions to the contracting problem in open systems in-
volve minor changes to the law, or suggestions that existing law, perhaps with minor 
modifications or relaxations, can accommodate the problem. The fifth is more rad-
ical and involves treating artificial agents as legal agents without legal personality, 
while the sixth, the most radical, giving legal personality to artificial agents. The fifth 
and sixth potential solutions are collectively referred to as the ‘agency law ap-
proach.’”). 
 149.  UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (1999), 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%20Act 
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signatures, thereby giving electronic records and signatures the same 
legal equivalence as traditional paper records and manual signatures.150 
The stated goal of the UETA is to “establish the legal equivalence of elec-
tronic records and signatures with paper writings and manually-signed 
signatures.”151 It sought to avoid having the selection of medium govern 
the outcome of any disputes or disagreements.152 It would be contrary 
to the purpose of the law to find that algorithmic contracts are enforce-
able simply because they were formed electronically. The enforceability 
of algorithmic contracts must turn on general private law rules. 
There is consensus around the notion of some algorithms being able 
to act as agents.153 There is not, however, consensus around what is 
meant by agent and how to answer the question of enforceability. The 
commission for the Uniform Commercial Code amended the UCC in 
2003 to include a definition of electronic agents, but the amendment 
was withdrawn in 2009 due to opposition from states and industry.154 
As Anthony J. Bellia observed soon after the adoption of the UETA 
in 2001, “legislative initiatives have addressed the use of ‘electronic 
agents’ in contract formation, but have not resolved the difficult en-
forceability questions . . . . The initiatives, like the common law, provide 
no clear answer to the question of enforceability when these conditions 
are not fulfilled.”155 Unfortunately, since 2001, courts and legislatures 
have come no closer to a workable solution for an approach to enforcing 
algorithmic contracts.  
There are two ways to create an agency relationship: by agreement 
 
[https://perma.cc/B64Y-NFLM]. 
 150. See Patricia Brumfield Fry, Introduction to the Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act: Principles, Policies and Provisions, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 237, 248 (2001) (“[The UETA] 
is designed to be evolutionary, leaving existing law undisturbed while establishing 
certainty and stability by affirming the equivalency of electronic records and signa-
tures with paper media.”). 




 152. Id.; See also Electronic Transactions Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2017), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic+Transac-
tions+Act [https://perma.cc/XUV8-ZS7D] (“The objective of UETA is to make sure 
that transactions in the electronic marketplace are as enforceable as transactions 
memorialized on paper and with manual signatures, but without changing any of 
the substantive rules of law that apply.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Chopra & White, supra note 148, at 376; Juliet M. Moringiello & 
William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future 
of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 483-87 (2013); Anthony J. 
Bellia Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047, 1048 (2001). 
 154. U.C.C. § 2-103(g) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2003) (withdrawn 
2011). 
 155.  Bellia, supra note 153, at 1048. 
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or by ratification.156 An agency relationship by agreement must have a 
manifestation of consent to the agency relationship, either express or 
implied.157 For an agency relationship to arise by ratification, the prin-
cipal must accept the benefit or affirm the conduct of the person pur-
porting to act on the principal’s behalf.158 Importantly, there must be 
some objective evidence that the principal knew of the act and elected 
to be bound by it.159 
Ratification is likely to be a predominant method for authorizing 
algorithms as agents. This is because it may not be possible or desirable 
for many companies using algorithms as agents to predict and claim to 
authorize every decision the algorithm may make with the requisite 
specificity required. The agency model adds the important interpretive 
piece to the equation of making the company using the algorithm pro-
vide some objective evidence that it knew of the act of the algorithm and 
intended to be bound by it.  
There are at least three possible ways a company can show intent to 
be bound. First, the principal can create a stalking algorithm that deliv-
ers real time updates on the relevant actions of the contracting algo-
rithm and theories as to why the algorithm might be acting in this way. 
Second, the principal can acquire insurance for the algorithm’s poten-
tial for uncertainty. Finally, and most simply, the principal can, I argue, 
introduce a human approval node for each transaction. 
This approach to evaluating algorithmic contracts does a better job 
at achieving the goals of reducing externalities and preserving fair play 
in commerce than the ambiguous status quo of ignoring algorithmic 
contracts as a special category of agreement. The approach does this 
while doing justice to the actions and risks assumed by the parties to the 
agreement. Put another way, this multi-pronged approach to algorith-
mic contracts allows the law to uphold algorithmic agreements when 
they are fairly made, but rightfully gives relief when they are not. State 
legislatures, courts, and organizations that advise on private law, such 
as the American Legal Institute, should update their approach to the law 
to reflect this view of algorithmic contracts. This modern problem re-
quires renewed interest in and clarification of agency, an area of private 
law that has been considered arcane.160 This is a rule that seeks internal-
ization of costs of the use of algorithms. As Robert Cooter and Ariel 
Porat recently wrote: “When internalization is the legal goal of private 
 
 156.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 4.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006). 
 157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 (Am. Law Inst. 2006). 
 158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 4.01, 4.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006). 
 159. Id. 
 160.  See George S. Geis, Gift Promises and the Edge of Contract Law, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 663, 666 (2014) (defining and discussing the “edges” of contract law and 
their increasing import to shore up the argument that “third-party beneficiary law 
should receive independent legal significance”). 
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law, the appropriate remedy is compensation for harms and disgorge-
ment of benefits. Besides internalization, another goal of private law is 
to stop injurers from harming others (deter), and more rarely, to spur 
people to benefit others (encourage). Courts have recognized least cost 
avoider status as a factor in determining when to recognize inherent 
agency.161 The law minimally deters a harmful act when the injurer nei-
ther gains nor loses from acting.”162 In order to have enforceable con-
tracts, which any entity wants, the agency model for algorithmic con-
tracts requires that the entity form the requisite level of intent to be 
culpable for its actions in tort and other causes of action. 
To make this section concrete, consider the legal entitlements of 
those involved in the “DAO hack” as an example. Under the argument I 
have advance above, contract law could recognize the DAO as an agent 
able to bind its principals (the investors) in contract via code. Therefore, 
the investors who lost money in the DAO hack should not be able to 
recover their money from the hacker, and the hacker should be able to 
sue for breach of contract if the money were not delivered. This raises 
the risk associated with the DAO as a business structure. However, the 
DAO structure has other structural advantages. This rather harsh legal 
position encourages algorithmic accountability for creators of and in-
vestors in DAOs. 
Any argument that the DAO hack should not be considered an en-
forceable contract should not come from the notion that the algorithm 
does not reflect the intent of investors. This would be a blow to any in-
centive for the creator of a DAO to carefully structure the organization 
to minimize risk. However, there may be other limits on the enforcea-
bility of algorithmic contracts. There might be some policy reasons to 
limit the scope of an algorithm’s ability to bind a party in contract. Fur-
thermore, there might be limits to which code can be considered con-
tracts. These will be areas of future study and debate in algorithmic con-
tracts. 
B. Impact of Agency Analysis for Other Causes of Action 
The agency approach to algorithmic contracts would allow agencies 
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to successfully pursue actions against companies for fraud, market ma-
nipulation, and other wrongful acts under current standards. This pro-
motes algorithmic accountability, allowing companies to have the req-
uisite intent to be held accountable. Currently, because of the uncertain 
status of the law, companies are able to have it both ways with their al-
gorithmic contracts with respect to intent. They use algorithmic con-
tracts, which would imply the specific intent to agree to a given trans-
action. But when it comes to liability for the bad outcomes of the trade 
made by the algorithm, agencies struggle to show the intent as specific 
enough. The regulation of the market for futures contracts by the U.S. 
Commodities Futures Trading serves as an illustrative example.  
Gregory Scopino recently published an article describing a regula-
tory quandary faced by the agency where he used to work. There are 
several plainly illegal trading practices under the Commodity Exchange 
Act (CEA) and the CFTC’s regulation that are nonetheless routinely car-
ried out by trading algorithms.163 The CFTC cannot pursue a successful 
case against companies that use algorithms to make the trades because 
the laws require either specific intent or outright recklessness.164 The 
algorithms are considered to be too attenuated from the intent of the 
companies who use them to rise to that level of intent.165  
On an agency interpretation of algorithmic contracts, the CFTC or 
another actor could make the argument that companies that had algo-
rithms that engaged in this type of fraud actually did have the requisite 
intent to be brought into court for breach of the CEA and CFTC regu-
lations.  
In this way, the intent that we can draw from algorithmic contracts 
can promote algorithmic accountability in society. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Machine learning algorithms are increasingly involved in the for-
mation of business-to-business contracts, so it is important to think 
about how law comes into play when analyzing how algorithms are in 
contract formation. This Article has provided a justification for how 
they are formed and deemed enforceable that promotes algorithmic ac-
countability. Algorithms should be considered constructive agents for 
the purpose of contract formation in order to enable finding liability for 
wrongful acts such as fraud or market manipulation arising from the 
contracts and to promote algorithmic accountability. 
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